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NO REFUGE FOR THE SICK: HOW THE EU’S HEALTHBASED NON-REFOULEMENT STANDARD COMPOUNDS
THE EXCLUSIONARY NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE LAW
Cassandra Baker*
Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic poses grave threats to the life and health
of asylum seekers in Europe. Many potential asylees are forced to reside in
cramped, unsanitary facilities and do not have adequate access to medical
treatment. On top of these dangers, many are likely to be denied asylum due to the
stringency of international refugee law and European Union (“EU”) asylum
procedures. As a result, a number of these asylum seekers will turn to Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides broader nonrefoulement protections. However, even Article 3, as currently interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), is unlikely to protect the majority of
these asylum seekers. This article proposes ways in which the ECtHR may refine
its health-based non-refoulement jurisprudence to protect more individuals. It
concludes that the Court may retain its current high standard for qualifying for
health-based non-refoulement and provide relief for individuals who contract
COVID-19 while detained by EU member states during the asylum application
process. Significantly, the ECtHR should hold that EU member states who detain
asylum seekers and thereby expose them to COVID-19 have assumed a duty toward
them and may not refoule them for the duration of their illness and its lingering
health effects.
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INTRODUCTION
Asylum seekers in European Union (“EU”) member states are
contracting COVID-19,1 but instead of care and recovery, they are likely to
face medical and legal hardship. Many are forced to live in overcrowded
facilities where sanitation measures are inadequate and social distancing is
impossible. A Greek refugee camp with nearly 3,000 residents reported
infections in early April 2020 and “was cut off from the world overnight.”2 In
September 2020, a refugee camp on the Greek island of Samos, intended to
house approximately 700 people, had around 4,500 residents living “in
squalid conditions.”3 It reported “dozens” of COVID-19 cases.4 In Germany,
asylum seekers are required to live in reception centers, and authorities have
reported outbreaks at multiple facilities.5 An administrative judge ruled that
protections against the coronavirus were “inadequate” at a facility in the town
of Rheine.6 One facility was placed on lockdown with a mix of infected and
uninfected residents,7 an approach the European Centre for Disease
1

Anna Doliwa-Klepacka & Mieczysława Zdanowicz, The European Union Current Asylum Policy:
Selected Problems in the Shadow of COVID-19, INT. J. SEMIOT. L. (2020).
2
Id.
3
Nektaria Stamouli, Migration crisis upends Greece’s coronavirus strategy, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2020,
11:11 AM), https://www.politico.eu/article/migration-crisis-upends-greeces-coronavirus-strategy-migrantscamps/.
4
Id.
5
Germany: Asylum-Seekers Tested Positive for COVID-19 in Reception Facility, EUR. COUNCIL ON
REFUGEES AND EXILES (May 22, 2020), https://www.ecre.org/germany-asylum-seekers-tested-positive-forcovid-19-in-reception-facilities/ (reporting outbreaks at facilities in Bonn, Berlin, and other locations in May
2020).
6
German court: COVID-19 protection ‘inadequate’ at refugee home, DEUTSCHE WELLE (May 11,
2020), https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-covid-19-protection-inadequate-at-refugee-home/a-533957
10; see also Germany: Asylum-Seekers Tested Positive for COVID-19 in Reception Facility, supra note 5.
7
Philip Oltermann, Refugees in German centre fear lack of protection as Covid-19 cases soar, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2020, 8:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/15/refugees-in-germancentre-fear-lack-of-protection-as-covid-19-cases-soar.
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Prevention and Control later deemed inappropriate.8 In Italy, reception centers
lack sufficient space, ventilation, water, and electricity.9 The health and lives
of thousands of detained asylum seekers are at risk.
While some EU member states have chosen to release individuals from
detention, this has often left them homeless. In the early months of the
pandemic, Belgium released approximately half of the migrants it had
detained, leaving many homeless and dependent on assistance from private
individuals.10 Spain also released migrants due to the pandemic—but not
those “in packed transit centers on its island enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.”11
Ultimately, many asylum seekers in EU countries have contracted COVID-19
while detained, and more will continue to do so.
Unfortunately for many of these asylum seekers, their troubles will not
end there. Due to the outdated, restrictive definition of “refugee” used in
international law, and several structural problems with the EU’s common
asylum system, many individuals currently seeking asylum in Europe are
likely to be denied relief despite their genuine fear of serious harm or death
upon return to their countries of origin. Those who have contracted COVID19 may turn to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”) in a final attempt to protect themselves from being returned to
countries where they face danger and a lack of adequate medical care. Yet
Article 3, too, is unlikely to provide relief because the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has interpreted it in a narrow manner that withholds
protection from all but the most extreme cases when the harm is based on
illness. This state of affairs could leave thousands of people unprotected—at
risk of being returned to countries where they face persecution and even death.
This article assesses asylum seekers’ barriers to immigration relief and
chances for success, seeking changes to the law that could prevent harm to
people who are at risk now. It concludes that the ECtHR should change its
jurisprudence on health-based non-refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR
by providing clearer standards for member states. The ECtHR should also
8

EUR. CTR. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL, GUIDANCE ON INFECTION PREVENTION AND
CONTROL OF CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) IN MIGRANT AND REFUGEE RECEPTION AND DETENTION
CENTRES IN THE EU/EEA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 14 (2020), https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/documents/COVID-19-guidance-refugee-asylum-seekers-migrants-EU.pdf.
9
Giada Zampano, Assisting migrants at risk as coronavirus strikes Italy, ANADOLU AGENCY (Mar.
24, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/assisting-migrants-at-risk-as-coronavirus-strikes-italy/1777138.
10
Monika Pronczuk, ‘I Could Be One of Them’: Belgians Help Migrants Amid Coronavirus, N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/world/europe/belgium-migrantscoronavirus.html.
11
Karina Piser, The End of Immigration Detention Doesn’t Mean the End of Fortress Europe,
FOREIGN POLICY (July 31, 2020, 11:02 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/31/coronavirus-asylum-endimmigration-detention-spain-france-end-of-fortress-europe/.
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hold that EU member states who detain asylum seekers have assumed a duty
toward them, and thus may not refoule12 any who contract COVID-19 while
detained for the duration of their illness and any lingering health effects.
Part I of this article provides a short overview of the pandemic and
restrictions imposed on those seeking asylum in the EU during the pandemic.
It briefly reviews the health dangers and uncertainties surrounding COVID19. Part II reviews the international law on asylum and the EU asylum
framework. It outlines the gaps in this legal framework that leave many
asylum seekers without protection. It concludes that current asylum law and
EU procedures are likely to leave many asylum seekers without protection
and at a high risk of contracting COVID-19. Part III starts with a
jurisprudential review of non-refoulement and health-based non-refoulement
under Article 3 of the ECHR. Part III then evaluates whether current nonrefoulement jurisprudence may provide relief for individuals who are denied
asylum but have developed long-term health consequences from COVID-19.
Finally, it proposes changes to current jurisprudence to provide relief to more
such individuals.
I.

THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC CREATED HURDLES AND HEALTH
HAZARDS FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE EU

Most simply, “COVID-19 is a disease caused by a virus called SARSCoV-2.”13 “COVID-19 spreads when an infected person breathes out droplets
and very small particles that contain the virus.”14 The first known cases were
reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019.15 As of February 2022, over
411 million cases have been reported worldwide, with over 5.8 million
deaths.16 Europe has been particularly hard hit.17
Asylum seekers are disproportionally affected by the pandemic, and EU
member states have curtailed their options for relief. On March 17, 2020, EU
12
To refoule an individual is to return him or her to a country where he or she faces persecution. See
David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hörtreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the NonRefoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2
(1999).
13
Frequently Asked Questions, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2021).
14
Id.
15
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, UPDATED ASSESSMENT ON COVID-19
ORIGINS 1 (2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Unclassified-Summary-ofAssessment-on-COVID-19-Origins.pdf.
16
COVID-19 Dashboard, CTR. FOR SYS. SCI. AND ENG’G AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
17
See id.
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countries closed their borders with non-EU countries for a period of 30 days.18
Although the European Commission included “[p]ersons in need of
international protection or for other humanitarian reasons respecting the
principle of non-refoulement” in its list of those who could still be permitted
to enter,19 many EU countries temporarily stopped accepting asylum
applications.20 The number of applications dropped from almost 70,000 in
January 2020 to fewer than 10,000 in April.21 Notably, the EU’s April 17,
2020, plan on lifting containment measures did not mention asylum.22 The
number of asylum applicants in the EU ultimately decreased by 32.6% in 2020
compared to 2019.23 In September 2020, Germany agreed to accept refugees
who were left homeless after a fire at a refugee camp on a Greek island, but
other EU member states did not follow suit.24 In sum, most EU member states
have shown particular unwillingness to accept refugees during the pandemic.
Many EU countries resumed deportation flights to countries such as
Afghanistan in late 2020.25 Yet the European Asylum Support Office
(“EASO”) believes the pandemic may ultimately lead more people to seek
asylum in Europe due to resulting strife.26
The EU’s treatment of asylum seekers during the pandemic is
particularly important, as the consequences of COVID-19 are not fully known
but have the potential to be severe. About 5% of those who contract COVID18

Communication from the Commission 2020/C 102 I/02 of 30 Mar. 2020, COVID-19: Guidance on
the implementation of the temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU, on the facilitation of transit
arrangements for the repatriation of EU citizens, and on the effects on visa policy, 2020 O.J. 3, 1.
19
Id. at 4. The principle of non-refoulement provides that States may not return a refugee to a place
where the refugee’s life will be in danger. Jill I. Goldenziel, Checking Rights at the Border: Migrant
Detention in International and Comparative Law, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. 159, 168 (2019).
20
Natalie Huet, EU asylum claims drop to lowest level in 12 years amid COVID-19 border closures,
EURONEWS (June 12, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/12/eu-asylum-claims-drop-to-lowestlevel-in-12-years-amid-covid-19-border-closures; EUR. ASYLUM SUPPORT OFF. [EASO], EASO SPECIAL
REPORT: ASYLUM TRENDS AND COVID-19, at 5 (June 11, 2020), https://easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/e
aso-special-report-asylum-covid-june-2020.pdf; Germany stops accepting refugees over coronavirus,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://p.dw.com/p/3Zedo.
21
EASO, supra note 20, at 5.
22
Information from the European Commission 2020/C 126/01 of 17 Apr. 2020, Joint European
Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures, 2020 O.J. 1.
23
EUROSTAT, ASYLUM APPLICATIONS (NON-EU) IN THE EU MEMBER STATES, 2008-2020 (Mar. 16,
2021), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics#Number_of_asyl
um_applicants:_decrease_in_2020.
24
Melissa Eddy, Germany to Take In 1,500 Refugees, Easing Burden on Greece After Fires, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/world/europe/germany-refugees-greece.html.
25
Benjamin Bathke, European countries resume deportation flights to Afghanistan after 9-moth
coronavirus break, INFOMIGRANTS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/29138/europeancountries-resume-deportation-flights-to-afghanistan-after-9-month-coronavirus-break.
26
Gabriela Baczynska, Coronavirus may push more asylum seekers toward EU: agency, REUTERS
(May 12, 2020, 2:18 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-migration/coronavirusmay-push-more-asylum-seekers-towards-eu-agency-idUSKBN22O18A; EASO, supra note 20, at 13.
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19 become critically ill,27 and medical professionals do not yet know all of the
possible long-term effects of COVID-19.28 One study found that 13.5% of
participants were still using oxygen at home a month after discharge from the
hospital.29 The virus affects many organs besides the lungs, and the Centers
for Disease Control (“CDC”) has emphasized the risk of heart damage.30
Medical professionals who have studied COVID-19 patients also fear longterm damage to the immune system and brain.31 Potential long-term
symptoms are not just physical: a small number of COVID-19 patients report
a lasting inability to think clearly.32 Patients of all ages around the world have
reported lingering symptoms over eight months after contracting COVID19.33 Thus, asylum seekers in the EU risk developing long-lasting health
consequences. As discussed below, this is particularly problematic given the
difficulty many will face in obtaining relief from being returned to their
countries of origin.
II.

ASYLUM FRAMEWORKS LEAVE MANY ASYLUM SEEKERS
VULNERABLE TO REFOULEMENT AND COVID-19

International law and regional EU law provide substantive rights for
refugees and a framework of procedures for seeking asylum. However, these
rights and procedures routinely fall short, leaving many asylum seekers
unprotected under the law and exposed to unhealthy conditions during the
process. Thousands of people apply for asylum in the EU every year, and
many of them are denied relief. In 2019, there were 721,075 applications for
asylum filed in EU member states.34 In addition, the EU recognized 2,712,477
refugees, defined as “people fleeing their home country to save their lives and
27

What we know about Long-term effects of COVID-19, WHO (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/risk-comms-updates/update-36-long-termsymptoms.pdf?sfvrsn=5d3789a6_2.
28
Long-Term Effects of COVID-19, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/long-termeffects.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2021).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Michael Marshall, The Lasting Misery of Coronavirus Long-Haulers, NATURE (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02598-6.
32
Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, From ‘Brain Fog’ to Heart Damage, COVID-19’s Lingering Problems
Alarm Scientists, SCI. MAG. (Jul. 31, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/brain-fogheart-damage-covid-19-s-lingering-problems-alarm-scientists.
33
Andrea Salcedo, A Canadian woman has been sick with covid-19 long-term effects for nearly 9
months: ‘I’m definitely worried it will be permanent,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2020, 3:38 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/12/09/canadian-woman-long-hauler-coronavirus/.
34
European
Parliament,
Asylum
Applications
in
the
EU
(2019),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/infographic/welcoming-europe/index_en.html#filter=2019 (last visited
Sept. 18, 2020).
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who have been accepted and recognized as such in their host country.”35 The
following countries received the majority of the asylum applications filed in
2019: Germany, France, Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Italy.36 All
of these countries, other than the United Kingdom, granted asylum or another
form of relief from deportation at widely varying rates in the first quarter of
2020.37 Denial rates for those five countries ranged from a low of 40% in
Spain to a high of 79% in France.38 Ultimately, then, tens of thousands of
asylum applicants did not receive protection.39
As explained below, international non-refoulement law fundamentally
fails to protect people fleeing certain forms of hardship, leaving them without
protection. The EU’s common asylum system also suffers from procedural
flaws that strain member states’ asylum systems and expose applicants to
unsafe conditions. During the pandemic, these conditions put asylum
applicants at a high risk of contracting COVID-19.
A.

The International Asylum Framework

In theory, international law provides broad protections for refugees.
The principle of non-refoulement—that states may not return a refugee to a
country where his or her life will be in danger—is generally considered a jus
cogens norm.40 International law has, however, adopted a narrow definition
of “refugee” that leaves many individuals unprotected.41 Reforms to
international refugee laws are needed, but many of the proposed solutions
would require consensus among the international community, which would
be difficult to achieve and arrive too late to address the hardship asylum
seekers currently face.

35

Id.
Id.
37
EUROSTAT, ASYLUM QUARTERLY REPORT 10 (June 15, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_quarterly_report#Decisions_on_asylum_applications.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
A jus cogens norm is “a peremptory norm that no state can violate.” Goldenziel, supra note 19, at
168–69.
41
Leti Volpp, Refugees Welcome, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 71, 94 (2018); Silvia Pasquetti et al.,
Law and Refugee Crises, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 289, 291 (2019); Tally Kritzman-Amir, The Shifting
Categorization of Immigration Law, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 290 (2020).
36
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An overview of international law on refugees

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
Convention”) forms the foundation of international asylum law.42 Notably, the
Refugee Convention only uses the word “asylum” in the preamble.43 The
Convention itself “lays down the principle of non-refoulement . . . .”44 Ratified
in the aftermath of World War II, the Refugee Convention originally applied
only to events that occurred before 1951 in Europe, with the option for states
to extend their obligations.45 The Refugee Convention provides that, to qualify
as a refugee, the individual must have a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion . . . .”46 The Refugee Convention
“has been subject to only one amendment in the form of a 1967 Protocol,
which removed the geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention.”47
The Protocol did not change the requirement that persecution be on account
of one of the five grounds enumerated in the Refugee Convention, meaning
that asylum applicants today must meet this requirement.48
Every EU member state is a party to the Refugee Convention.49 The EU
incorporated the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol through its Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.50 EU directives related to
asylum emphasize that the Refugee Convention and Protocol are the
“cornerstone” for refugee protection.51
However, the EU has, from its inception, struggled to commit to human
rights and equality as it continues to impose restrictions on asylum seekers.
The Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) stated that the EU would “frame a
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on
42

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S 137 [hereinafter Refugee
Convention].
43
Id. pmbl.
44
Daniel Ghezelbash & Nikolas Feith Tan, The End of the Right to Seek Asylum? COVID-19 and the
Future of Refugee Protection 2 (Eur. U. Inst., Working Paper RSCAS 2020/55, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3689093.
45
Refugee Convention, supra note 42, art. 1, §§ A & B.
46
Id. art. 1, § A(2).
47
Id. intro. n.
48
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, § 2, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S 267 [hereinafter
Optional Protocol].
49
Manuel P. Schoenhuber, The European Union’s Refugee Deal with Turkey: A Risky Alliance
Contrary to European Laws and Values, 40 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 633, 650 (2018).
50
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 18, Dec. 18, 2000 O.J. (C 326) 391, 399.
51
See, e.g., Directive 2011/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Dec. 2011 on
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the
content of the protection granted (recast), 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 9 [hereinafter Qualification Directive].
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solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country
nationals.”52 The TEU also stated, “[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area
of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free
movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures
with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the
prevention and combating of crime.”53 By mentioning asylum and
immigration in conjunction with crime, the treaty implied that asylum seekers
could be a threat. Below, the article will further explore the tension between
human rights and immigration controls, particularly focusing on detention.
2.

The shortcomings of international law on refugees

The international refugee framework suffers from several welldocumented shortcomings. The first is the narrow definition of “refugee”
adopted in the Refugee Convention.54 Because it requires that persecution be
on account of one of five enumerated grounds, the Refugee Convention “does
not protect those fleeing war, mass violence, or foreign aggression.”55
Likewise, “economic refugees” (those fleeing poverty) do not fit into any of
the five enumerated protected grounds,56 nor do those fleeing environmental
catastrophe.57 Many individuals seeking asylum today have fled their
countries of origin due to these unprotected reasons.58 Thus, many people
currently seeking asylum are likely to be denied relief. Second, by
categorically excluding certain individuals from the protection asylum
provides, the Refugee Convention perpetuates a “migrant/refugee binary” that
defines individuals by the type of relief for which they are eligible, rather than
by their individual stories.59 As a result, individuals who have suffered greatly,
but not on account of a protected ground, are viewed as less worthy of
protection.60

52

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 67, § 2, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C

326) 73.
53

Id. art. 3, § 2, at 17.
Volpp, supra note 41, at 94; Cathryn Costello & Itamar Mann, Border Justice: Migration and
Accountability for Human Rights Violations, 21 GER. L.J. 311, 313 (2020).
55
Pasquetti, supra note 41, at 291. See also Goldenziel, supra note 19, at 53.
56
See Volpp, supra note 41, at 95.
57
Kritzman-Amir, supra note 41, at 290.
58
Pasquetti, supra note 41, at 291; Alex Otieno, Protecting Refugee Health and Human Rights in the
Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Challenges and Pathways to Justice, in 2 SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE
AGE OF COVID-19 99 (Glenn W. Muschert et al. eds., 2020) (noting that fully one percent of the world’s
population was displaced in 2019).
59
Kritzman-Amir, supra note 41, at 284, 287–88.
60
Id. at 288.
54
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A third shortcoming of the current refugee framework is the unequal
distribution of refugees among nations of the world.61 Under the current
system, refugees are expected to apply for asylum in the first country they
enter in which they may do so, rather than traveling through several countries
to settle and apply where they prefer.62 As a result, some states may receive
more refugees than they can adequately care for—or states may decide they
do not wish to receive any more refugees.63 For example, after accepting
millions of Syrian refugees fleeing the Assad regime beginning in 2011,
Turkey closed its borders to them beginning in March 2015, with an exception
only for those with serious injuries.64
3.

The shortcomings of proposals to reform international law
on refugees

Proposals to address the shortcomings of the international refugee
framework frequently represent major political and diplomatic aspirations that
would be difficult to achieve. To address the gaps in protection, Jill Goldenziel
proposed a binding international agreement creating a new category of
“displaced persons,” who would have different rights from refugees.65
However, she stated that “[e]conomic migrants, climate change migrants, and
IDPs [internally displaced persons]” should not be included in the definition.66
Thus, many individuals would not receive protection under this proposal, and
the international community would still be left with the problem of how to
address their needs. States would likely reject a broad definition of “displaced
persons” because it would require them to receive more individuals. In short,
there is an inverse relationship between how many displaced persons the
definition would protect and how likely nations would be to accept such a
definition as part of a binding international agreement. Given that there has
been no major binding international treaty on refugees since 1967,67 it is
unlikely that the international community will agree to a convention on
displaced persons any time soon.

61

Maj. Yvonne S. Brakel et al., 50 Years Was Too Long to Wait: The Syrian Refugee Crisis Has
Highlighted the Need for a Second Optional Protocol to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, 40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 51, 54 (2017).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 59.
64
Id. at 61.
65
Goldenziel, supra note 19, at 71–72.
66
Id. at 78.
67
See id. at 61, 63–64.
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To address the unequal distribution of refugees, Maj. Yvonne S. Brakel
proposed that states adopt a second optional protocol to the Refugee
Convention “to create a predictable and equitable refugee resettlement plan
among the international community.”68 Under such a protocol, nations could
allocate refugees based on “soft quotas,” defined as an “equitable distribution
of refugees based upon an index that considers individual country GNP and
population density.”69 Alternatively, nations could adopt a regional sharing
model such as the one the EU employs.70 However, as explored below, such
a model has failed to solve the problem of the unequal distribution of refugees
in the EU.71 In addition, for an optional protocol to function effectively,
enough states would have to sign on to the treaty, which would require
significant political and diplomatic negotiation.72 The process would be
neither fast nor simple.
In contrast to the two preceding international law solutions, Stephen
Meili proposed that states could instead emphasize a domestic constitutional
basis of the right to asylum.73 Countries such as Germany, France, and Italy
have included the right to asylum in their constitutions, but in practice they
rely on the Refugee Convention, and not on their constitutions, when
adjudicating asylum claims.74 This is not necessarily a problem, despite the
shortcomings of the Refugee Convention. Emphasizing a constitutional basis
of asylum would rely on the political will of dozens of nations around the
world and would be unlikely to promote uniform standards of adjudication.
Deemphasizing international law would also make it easier for states to
decline to provide asylum as a matter of national prerogative or constitutional
interpretation. For instance, Hungary has excluded virtually all asylum
seekers for the stated rationale of protecting national identity.75 Because
Hungary is a member of the EU and thus bound by the Refugee Convention
and 1967 Protocol as an EU member state, other EU nations have an additional
basis on which to pressure Hungary.76 To rely on domestic constitutions to
protect the right to asylum would be to perpetuate the unequal distribution of
refugees and leave states less accountable when they mistreat asylum seekers.
68
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In sum, the international refugee framework fails to protect many
individuals who face danger in their country of origin. Proposed solutions tend
to be politically contentious structural reforms that may never be accepted by
the international community. Even if they were, they would not be
implemented in time to protect individuals currently facing refoulement.
While reform is needed, the international community must consider more
immediate solutions to provide relief for those currently seeking protection in
another country, particularly during a global pandemic.
B.

The EU Common Asylum Framework

For more than twenty-five years, the EU has tried to create a common
asylum framework.77 The current system relies on both national and
international law: “migration into and within Europe is regulated by a
combination of national law, EU law, the ECHR, the European Social Charter
(“ESC”), and other international obligations agreed to by European
countries.”78 The common asylum framework applies to nations covered by
the Schengen Borders Code, which regulates movement between EU
countries, and between non-EU and EU countries.79 The framework is a mix
of regulations—which are directly legally binding—and directives, which the
member states must transpose into their national law.80 As discussed below,
this framework suffers from several shortcomings: it is not truly common, it
disproportionately burdens some member states, and it provides for excessive
restrictions on asylum seekers’ freedom of movement. These shortcomings all
contribute to the risk that asylum seekers will be denied asylum and will
contract COVID-19 while in the custody of member states.
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An overview of the EU common asylum framework

The EU’s common asylum framework is governed by a combination of
regulations and directives, with the principal ones briefly outlined here.
Perhaps the most controversial is the Dublin Regulation, which tells EU
member states how to determine which state is responsible for adjudicating
an individual’s asylum application and allows states to transfer asylum
seekers to another member state.81 It provides that the determining EU
member state “shall conduct a personal interview with the applicant” to
determine which country is responsible for the application.82 The regulation
lays out a hierarchy of criteria for states.83 Significantly, the regulation
provides that where an asylum seeker enters the EU “irregularly,” the member
state through which the individual entered is responsible for adjudicating the
asylum application.84 Where transfer to another member state is warranted,
the regulation favors transferring applicants to a member state where they
have family.85 The Dublin Regulation intends to prevent asylum seekers from
engaging in forum shopping between EU member states, to prevent applicants
from filing multiple applications in different states, and to prevent member
states from denying protection.86 To address this last objective, the regulation
outlines situations in which transfer of an asylum seeker to a different country
is not appropriate, including where there is “a risk of inhuman or degrading
treatment” in the state to which the individual would be transferred.87
Also significant in the regulatory framework is the so-called Asylum
Procedures Directive, which outlines procedures that EU member states must
follow when granting or withdrawing international protection.88 The Directive
covers matters such as when a member state must register an application,89
the right to an interpreter,90 the right to a personal interview,91 and the right to
81
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free legal assistance for appeals.92 The European Asylum Support Office,
established in 2010, is intended to facilitate member states’ compliance with
the common asylum procedures.93 The EASO has “no powers in relation to
the taking of decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual
applications for international protection.”94 Thus, member states exercise
significant control over the process.
The EU has adopted a directive outlining standards for the reception of
applicants for international protection (“Reception Conditions Directive”).95
The directive addresses matters including when detention is acceptable and
the nature of detention,96 as well as access to education,97 employment,98 and
vocational training.99 The directive also provides that applicants’ living
conditions should “protect their physical and mental health.”100 At minimum,
applicants must receive “emergency care and essential treatment of illnesses
and of serious mental disorders.”101 In contrast, those who are approved for
international protection “have access to healthcare under the same eligibility
conditions as nationals of the Member State that has granted such
protection.”102
In addition to its common asylum framework, the EU also has a
directive intended to standardize the return of third-country nationals who are
unlawfully present in a member state (“Returns Directive”).103 The Returns
Directive allows member states to detain individuals subject to return
procedures but sets a limit of six months.104 Member states may extend the
period for an additional twelve months only where the individual does not
cooperate with removal or where there is a delay in obtaining documentation
from third countries.105
92
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The shortcomings of the EU common asylum framework

The EU’s asylum framework faces many challenges that lead to poor
outcomes for applicants and place heavy burdens on some member states.
These challenges will particularly affect applicants during the pandemic. First,
because much of the framework consists of directives, which are not directly
legally binding, member states determine the “‘forms and methods’ to
transpose into their national law.”106 Thus, the system is not truly common.107
Second, the Dublin Regulation has failed to fairly allocate
responsibility for adjudicating asylum applications among EU member states.
In 2015, many asylum seekers first entered the EU through Greece and Italy,
which were then responsible for adjudicating most of their asylum
applications under the Dublin Regulation.108 Both countries failed to cope
with the increased number of asylum seekers, who suffered poor living
conditions as a result.109 The EU Council passed a plan to take in 120,000
Syrian refugees in 2015, but several countries objected to a mandatory refugee
quota.110 The EU thus confronts a tension between its emphasis on solidarity
between member states and its obligation to receive asylum seekers and
evaluate their applications.111
Several EU member states have opposed immigration to a degree that
has tested solidarity between EU nations and left asylum seekers unprotected.
Hungary, for instance, received more asylum applicants per 100,000 residents
of the country than any other EU member state in 2015.112 Three years later,
the country’s parliament passed a constitutional amendment that prohibits
“the resettlement of foreign populations within Hungary and limits asylum
106
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only to those who enter Hungary directly from their country of origin.”113 The
country built a border fence and began prosecuting asylum seekers who
crossed it without permission.114 Hungary also refused to adhere to the EU
Council’s 2015 quota plan.115 Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban,
asserted that most asylum seekers were economic migrants.116 This argument
attempts to remove these individuals from the Refugee Convention’s umbrella
of protection.117 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) concluded that Hungary’s prosecution of asylum seekers who enter
the country unlawfully violated the Refugee Convention.118 Ultimately,
Hungary’s refusal to evaluate asylum seekers’ claims forces neighboring EU
member states to bear that responsibility.
Third, as noted above, EU member states that accept asylum seekers
often detain them or require them to live in mass housing. In 2013, before the
influx of Syrian refugees, at least twenty European states permitted or
mandated detention of migrants to facilitate the adjudication and removal
process.119 At present, 57% of EU member states limit detention to eighteen
months.120
In recent years, EU member states have further restricted asylum
seekers’ freedom of movement. Germany, for instance, amended its Asylum
Act in 2019 to require asylum seekers to reside in a “reception centre” until
the Federal Office adjudicates the asylum application.121 If the Federal Office
denies the asylum application, the applicant may be detained for up to
eighteen months, until the person is deported.122 German states may extend
the period to twenty-four months.123 On its face, this twenty-four-month
period conflicts with the Returns Directive.124
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Beyond questions of liberty and the right to freedom of movement, the
EU’s detention of asylum seekers poses health risks. Many detention facilities
are “at the EU’s periphery.”125 In April 2020, in response to COVID-19, the
European Commission released guidance suggesting member states reduce
capacity of “specialised detention facilities” to reduce contamination and use
“other appropriate facilities” to detain migrants.126 The guidance did not,
however, recommend releasing individuals from detention. As described
above, many of the facilities where asylum seekers are detained cannot
provide adequate sanitation and do not permit social distancing because they
are overcrowded.127 Significantly, as applicants for, rather than recipients of
protection, asylum seekers are not entitled to the same level of healthcare as
EU citizens.128 Detained asylum seekers have a high risk of contracting
COVID-19 and of receiving inadequate care once they do.
In sum, the international asylum framework leaves many people
without protection, and the EU common asylum procedure directly heightens
applicants’ risk of contracting COVID-19 while they await adjudication. The
Dublin system unequally distributes applicants among member states, who
then sequester asylum seekers in detention facilities that are too often
overcrowded and unsanitary. Denied asylum, ill with COVID-19, and afraid
to return to their country of origin, many applicants will seek an alternate basis
to remain in an EU member state.
III.

ARTICLE 3 OF THE ECHR PROTECTS VERY FEW FAILED
ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH COVID-19-RELATED HEALTH
CONDITIONS FROM NON-REFOULEMENT

Many of the thousands of asylum seekers who do not receive asylum
will turn to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights to seek
relief from refoulement. Unfortunately, most of those with COVID-19-related
health conditions are likely to fail in their Article 3 claim, just as they failed
125

Cathryn Costello, Overcoming Refugee Containment and Crisis, 21 GER. L.J. 17, 18 (2020).
Communication from the Commission 2020/C 126/02 of 20 Apr. 2020, COVID-19: Guidance on
the implementation of relevant EU provisions in the area of asylum and return procedures and on
resettlement, 2020 O.J. 12, 16.
127
E.g., Doliwa-Klepacka, supra note 1 (Greece); Tsourdi, supra note 107, at 374–75 (Greece);
German court: COVID-19 protection ‘inadequate’ at refugee home, supra note 6 (Ger.); Zampano, supra
note 9 (It.).
128
Compare Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 95, ch. II, art. 19, § 1, at 106 (requiring only
“emergency care and essential treatment of illnesses and of serious mental disorders”) with Qualification
Directive, ch. VII, art. 30, § 1, at 21 (“Member States shall ensure that beneficiaries of international protection
have access to healthcare under the same eligibility conditions as nationals of the Member State that has
granted such protection.”).
126

268

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 2

in their asylum claim. In the case of the ECHR, unlike the Refugee
Convention, the problem lies not in the language of the treaty but in its
application.
Nearly contemporaneous with the Refugee Convention, the European
Convention on Human Rights dates to 1950.129 The ECHR created the
European Court of Human Rights to enforce the ECHR and its protocols.130
EU member states are parties to the ECHR.131 The EU itself is still negotiating
accession to the treaty.132 The ECHR does not apply extraterritorially.133
The scope of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR depends on
the type of harm suffered and the source of that harm. For health-based claims,
non-refoulement jurisprudence imposes a high standard that most claimants
cannot meet. Under this standard, most individuals suffering long-term health
consequences from COVID-19 are unlikely to obtain relief. Therefore, the
ECtHR should implement several changes to its jurisprudence to broaden the
scope of protection for ill individuals. These changes include setting clearer
standards for refoulement and recognizing a duty not to refoule where the EU
member state exposed the individual to conditions that led to the illness.
A.

The Varying Scope of Non-Refoulement Under Article 3 of the
ECHR

The language of Article 3 of the ECHR suggests that protection should
be broad, but in practice, it varies, depending on the source and nature of the
harm. Article 3 of the ECHR provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”134 The nonrefoulement principle the ECtHR has developed from this article is distinct
from the right to asylum derived from the Refugee Convention.135 The ECtHR
has repeatedly affirmed that Article 3 is absolute, allowing no exceptions
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based on the conduct of the individual or national security concerns.136 Article
3 is also non-derogable, meaning that EU member states may not deviate from
its absolute prohibition, “even during a state of emergency.”137 In contrast, the
Refugee Convention allows states to expel a refugee “on grounds of national
security or public order.”138 In addition, while the Refugee Convention
requires that harm be based on at least one of five enumerated protected
grounds,139 Article 3 imposes no similar requirement.140 This makes it appear
to be an attractive option for individuals who did not receive asylum because
the harm they suffered did not fit within one of the five protected grounds.
Unfortunately, despite the apparent breadth of Article 3, protection is difficult
to obtain for health-based claims.
Article 3 imposes both positive and negative obligations on EU member
states. The primary duty is “a negative obligation not to inflict illtreatment.”141 Second, the duty to investigate alleged ill-treatment is
positive.142 Third, under certain circumstances, member states have a positive
obligation “to protect against ill-treatment inflicted by State agents and third
parties.”143 To fulfill this third obligation, they must “provide an adequate
legal framework to deter . . . threats of ill-treatment” and “safeguard
individuals from ill-treatment.”144 Unlike the primary, negative obligation, the
third obligation “is not absolute, and requires that the relevant body take
proportionate or ‘reasonable’ steps to protect.”145 As explored below, the
ECtHR has not extended this positive obligation in the context of nonrefoulement of noncitizens suffering from mental or physical illness.146
136
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The ECtHR has held that to engage Article 3, “ill-treatment must attain
a minimum level of severity.”147 The Court has declined to set a uniform
standard, stating that the required minimum “depends on all the circumstances
of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects
and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.”148 The
Court tends to set a lower minimum level where a government actor directly
inflicts ill-treatment. For example, in Bouyid v. Belgium, the ECtHR held that
Belgian police officers violated Article 3 when they slapped two youths they
had detained at the police station.149 The Court emphasized the fact that law
enforcement officials had inflicted physical violence on individuals in their
custody.150
The ECtHR requires a higher minimum level of severity in nonrefoulement cases, particularly those based on health reasons. In Tarakhel v.
Switzerland, the Court stated, “[t]he source of the risk does nothing to alter
the level of protection guaranteed by the Convention or the Convention
obligations of the State ordering the person’s removal.”151 In practice,
however, the minimum level of severity varies considerably based on the type
of harm alleged and its source. The ECtHR has set a high minimum level for
health-based non-refoulement cases, as explored in the next section of this
article.
Non-refoulement jurisprudence under Article 3 developed through
cases in which an individual contested extradition to a non-EU state. In
Soering v. The United Kingdom, a German national accused of murder in the
United States argued that the United Kingdom would violate Article 3 if it
extradited him to the United States, where he could be placed on death row
for an extended period of time.152 While the United Kingdom argued that it
could not be responsible for acts occurring outside its jurisdiction, the ECtHR
concluded that a member state could be responsible for “foreseeable
consequences of extradition suffered outside [its] jurisdiction.”153 The Court
proceeded to consider several factors, including Soering’s age and mental
state at the time of the alleged murders and how long he might be detained in
the United States, before concluding that extradition would violate Article
3.154 Soering thus established that refoulement could violate Article 3 where
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep at 79.
Id.; Weissbrodt & Hörtreiter, supra note 12, at 30.
Bouyid v. Belgium, 2015-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 457, 467, 494, 496.
Id.
Tarakhel v. Switzerland, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, 218.
Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 443–44 (1989).
Id. at 465–66, 468.
Id. at 475, 476–77, 478.

WINTER 2022

NO REFUGE FOR THE SICK

271

the receiving country was a developed nation with an independent legal
system. The ECtHR has reaffirmed the principles of Soering over a period of
decades.155
The ECtHR has repeatedly held that even transfer from one EU member
state to another may violate Article 3. In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the Court
held that Switzerland would violate Article 3 if it returned a family of Afghan
asylum seekers to Italy without obtaining adequate guarantees from Italy.156
Specifically, Switzerland needed guarantees from Italy “that the applicants
would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and
that the family would be kept together.”157 In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,
the Court held that Belgium knowingly exposed an Afghan asylum seeker to
degrading treatment when it returned him to Greece, a country Belgium knew
had poor holding conditions for asylum seekers.158 However, as discussed
below, the Court displays less concern for individuals who have already been
denied asylum and are seeking relief from removal under Article 3 based on
illness.
The ECtHR has held that states must provide procedural due process
when evaluating a non-refoulement claim under Article 3 due to the
fundamental nature of the article.159 Significantly, Article 3 imposes a duty on
states to investigate possible breaches.160 A failure to investigate may itself
constitute a breach of Article 3, as was the case in Tarakhel.161 The Court’s
analysis in Soering and Tarakhel indicates that the member state must
consider both the conditions in the receiving country and the individual’s
vulnerabilities. The following section further discusses how, until recently,
the Court failed to require a similar level of individualized analysis when
evaluating refoulement of noncitizens suffering from serious illness.
The ECtHR’s more general Article 3 jurisprudence thus indicates that
the article provides strong protections for individuals facing a wide range of
ill-treatment due to refoulement. However, as described in the next section,
the Court has not extended its generous, expansive analysis in the context of
health-based non-refoulement. Instead, the Court employs an analysis
155
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designed to limit the number of ill noncitizens who may benefit from Article
3. This analysis contradicts the absolute character of Article 3.
B.

The Narrow Scope of Non-Refoulement for Health-Based Harms
Under Article 3 of the ECHR

Non-refoulement protection under Article 3 is hard to obtain where the
harm is based on illness. The ECHR does not directly protect the right to
health.162 The ECtHR has articulated a narrow range of situations in which
refoulement of an ill person will be proscribed under the inhuman treatment
prong of Article 3.163 The Court has defined inhuman treatment as “intense
physical and mental suffering.”164 The Court has set a higher standard for
inhuman treatment to trigger protection under Article 3 where the harm
“emanate[s] . . . from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of sufficient
resources to deal with it in the receiving country.”165 It distinguishes such
cases from the more standard situation where the harm comes “from the
intentional acts or omissions of public authorities or non-State bodies.”166 The
Court also requires that the illness be “exacerbated by treatment, whether
flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which
the authorities can be held responsible.”167 The Court’s key health-based nonrefoulement cases indicate that floodgates concerns—the fear that too many
people would apply for and be granted non-refoulement under a less stringent
standard—underlie its reasoning. This leads to results inconsistent with
Article 3.
1.

Origins of health-based non-refoulement jurisprudence
and the “very exceptional circumstances” standard

Health-based non-refoulement jurisprudence under the ECHR
originated in the 1990s during the AIDS epidemic, and many of the Court’s
cases have concerned individuals whose claims were based on being HIV162

Sascha-Dominik Oliver Vladimir Bachmann & Joachim Sanden, State Responsibility for the
(Public) Right to Health and Security in Times of COVID Pandemic: A European Perspective, 7 INDON. J.
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positive.168 The earliest of these cases is D. v. The United Kingdom, a 1997
judgment in which the ECtHR held that the UK could not return a terminally
ill citizen of St. Kitts to that nation, where he had no one to care for him and
might not have been able to get a bed at one of two hospitals that cared for
AIDS patients.169 The Court feared that “the conditions of adversity which
await him in St. Kitts will further reduce his already limited life
expectancy.”170 The Court termed the situation one of “very exceptional
circumstances,” establishing the standard for showing a violation of Article 3
due to refoulement of an ill individual.171 Given that D was “facing imminent
death” even if not returned to St. Kitts, very few individuals qualify for relief
under this standard.172
Indeed, HIV-positive applicants in the ten years after D were uniformly
denied protection under Article 3.173 The ECtHR often held that the illness
was not sufficiently advanced.174 The Court placed great weight on the fact
that AIDS medication was available in a country, without considering whether
the individual applicant could actually obtain the treatment.175 The Court also
placed great weight on the presence of the applicant’s family members in the
receiving country, without analyzing whether those family members would
actually care for the applicant.176 The Court applied similar reasoning to

168

See, e.g., D. v. United Kingdom, App No. 30240/96, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423, 428 (1997); Karara v.
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applicants during this period who based their claims on mental illness.177 In
short, the Court applied a high standard that essentially required the applicant
to be on death’s doorstep and assumed the applicants would be able to access
adequate care without requiring the EU member state to investigate and
determine whether that was true.
On more than one occasion in the ten years after D, the Court also
appears to have improperly considered countervailing factors in order to
bolster its decision to deny relief. Despite the absolute character of Article 3,
which, as noted above, does not permit EU member states to balance the
reasons for removal against the harm to the applicant upon removal, the
ECtHR appeared to do so. For instance, in Amegnigan v. The Netherlands, the
Court detailed the applicant’s history of filing fraudulent applications for
asylum, dedicating as much of the decision to that procedural history as it did
to its analysis of the applicant’s Article 3 claim.178 In Ndangoya v. Sweden,
the Court emphasized the applicant’s criminal history.179 While the Court did
not mention criminal history or immigration fraud while analyzing the
applicants’ claims for protection, by framing the case through a lens of
criminality, the Court was at least implicitly indicating that the applicants
were individuals who did not deserve protection. This approach contrasts
sharply with cases such as Soering, where the Court focused more on the
conditions Soering faced upon extradition and less on the homicide he
allegedly committed, and considered his age and mental state as possible
mitigating factors.180 Health-based Article 3 claims under D faced both a
higher threshold of severity and greater consideration of negative equities, the
latter of which contradicts the article’s absolute character. Given these
demanding standards, it is no surprise that no applicant succeeded in the
decade after D.
2.

177

Entrenching the “very exceptional circumstances”
standard
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The ECtHR largely reaffirmed D in its 2008 decision N. v. The United
Kingdom, also making some of D’s implicit features explicit. In this case, the
Court held that return of the HIV-positive applicant to Uganda would not
violate Article 3, employing the “very exceptional circumstances” standard of
D.181 The Court stated that “the Convention is essentially directed at the
protection of civil and political rights” rather than social and economic
rights.182 It then explicitly endorsed finding “a fair balance between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”183 The Court went on to
say that Article 3 imposed no obligation on EU member states “to
alleviate . . . disparities” in medical treatment between EU nations and other
nations “through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens
without a right to stay within its jurisdiction.”184 N, like many individuals with
a health-based claim under Article 3, had previously applied for asylum and
been denied.185 The ECtHR’s concern for individuals with pending asylum
applications disappears if the application is denied, underscoring how the
migrant/refugee binary affects an applicant’s perceived worthiness.186 By
explicitly adopting a balancing test, the Court did not change its analysis but
confirmed that it had been balancing interests in health-based cases since D.
It also implied that Article 3 provides greater protection for some noncitizens
than others based on their immigration status, despite the absolute character
of the article.
Having established these principles, the Court found that returning N to
Uganda would not violate Article 3.187 The Court brushed aside N’s claim that
her family in Uganda would not care for her, and that she would not be able
to get the medication she needed in the rural part of Uganda where she would
live.188 The Court then declared, “The United Kingdom authorities have
provided the applicant with medical and social assistance at public expense
during the nine-year period it has taken for her asylum application and claims
181
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under [the ECHR] to be determined by the domestic courts and this Court.”189
Yet N was not claiming a right to medical treatment but relief from return to
Uganda.190 That is, she claimed a negative right not to be refouled, not a
positive right to be provided with medical care.191 The Court failed to
distinguish the two rights. Continuing with its trend of leaving many aspects
of its jurisprudence vague or implicit, the Court stated that “there may be other
very exceptional cases [besides the situation in D] where the humanitarian
considerations are equally compelling” but declined to suggest what those
circumstances might be.192 N’s circumstances apparently did not qualify.
Ultimately, the Court’s decision in N continued the jurisprudence of D.
More significant is the dissent of three out of fourteen judges, which correctly
identified the majority’s reasoning as endorsing a floodgates argument. The
dissent criticized the “very exceptional circumstances” standard in several
respects.193 It rejected the majority’s distinction between civil and political
rights and social and economic rights,194 and “strongly disagree[d]” with the
balancing test.195 Finally, the dissent observed that N was not claiming that
Article 3 required EU member states to provide free, unlimited medical care
to noncitizens without lawful status.196 The dissent charged that the majority
was in truth concerned that if N prevailed, it would “open up the floodgates
to medical immigration and make Europe vulnerable to becoming the
‘sickbay’ of the world.”197 The dissent then advocated investigating to see
whether a particular applicant would actually have access to necessary
treatment upon return.198 Subsequent events supported the dissent’s approach:
N was in fact returned to Uganda, where she died only months later.199
Cases decided in the wake of N resulted in denials due to both the
standard elaborated in N and the manner in which the ECtHR applied that
standard. In a shift from the pre-N era, most cases concerned mental illness or
physical ailments other than HIV/AIDS.200 The Court still applied the same
189
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standard and reasoning in these cases, as illustrated by the 2015 case of M.T.
v. Sweden. The applicant, a Uyghur from Kyrgyzstan, required blood dialysis
to treat his kidney problems.201 He was on the national waiting list for blood
dialysis in Kyrgyzstan, but the public health system in the country currently
could not offer any treatment due to a shortage of equipment.202 The Court
held that because the public system did have dialysis machines, and private
health facilities offered dialysis at a cost, it was “established that the applicant
would be able to receive dialysis treatment in his home country.”203 The Court
placed the burden on the applicant to show he could not pay for private
treatment.204 Perhaps recognizing the precariousness of the applicant’s
situation and its own analysis, the Court also “attache[d] significant weight”
to Sweden’s pledge to help the applicant “ensure that his dialysis treatment is
not interrupted and he has access to the medical care he needs upon return to
his home country.”205
M.T., like N itself and other post-N cases, also featured a dissent,
indicating that may judges were dissatisfied with the jurisprudence.206 The
M.T. dissent argued that non-refoulement should apply equally regardless of
whether the harm comes from a naturally occurring illness or a more
traditional state source.207 It then stated that the applicant had shown he would
not immediately be able to get dialysis upon return to Kyrgyzstan and
criticized the majority’s assumption that he could and reliance on the
government’s assurances.208 The increasing frequency of dissents after N
ultimately foreshadowed the case in which the Court confronted the high
standard and narrow scope that D and N set forth.
3.

Marginally
expanding
the
“very
exceptional
circumstances” standard and imposing a duty to
investigate on member states
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In 2016, the ECtHR partially retreated from the methodology of N,
making it somewhat easier for ill applicants to show that refoulement would
violate Article 3. Paposhvili v. Belgium concerned a Georgian national with
numerous health conditions who ultimately died before the ECtHR decided
his case.209 While in prison in Belgium, he “was diagnosed with chronic
lymphocytic leukaemia in Binet stage B” and was ultimately transferred to a
prison hospital.210 In addition, the applicant had previously suffered from
active pulmonary tuberculosis and developed chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease.211 He also suffered a stroke that left one arm permanently
paralyzed.212
The Court allowed two third parties to intervene, indicating that it was
willing to consider a new approach. The Georgian government intervened to
provide information about the state of medical treatment in the country.213 The
Human Rights Centre of Ghent University intervened to argue that the
standard of N was too restrictive and inconsistent with the absolute nature of
Article 3.214 The Human Rights Centre proposed a test requiring courts to
examine whether the applicant would actually have access to necessary
medical treatment.215 Under this test, Article 3 would impose a procedural
obligation on the authorities of the EU member state to seek assurances from
the receiving state that the individual would actually have access to necessary
medical treatment.216
While adhering to the “very exceptional circumstances” standard, the
Court ultimately adopted the Human Rights Centre’s recommendations to a
large degree. First, the Court acknowledged that the standard of D and N “has
deprived aliens who are seriously ill, but whose condition is less critical, of
the benefit of” Article 3.217 It went on to state that “other very exceptional
cases” as referred to in N
should be understood to refer to situations involving the removal
of a seriously ill person in which substantial grounds have been
shown for believing that he or she, although not at imminent risk
of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of
209
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211
212
213
214
215
216
217
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appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of
access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and
irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in
intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life
expectancy.218
Second, the Court explicitly placed on EU member states the obligation
to determine whether the applicant would actually have access to medical
treatment upon return. While the applicant bears the initial burden to
demonstrate “substantial grounds” to believe that refoulement would violate
Article 3, once the applicant has met that burden, the EU member state’s
authorities then bear the burden “to dispel any doubts raised by” the
applicant’s evidence.219 The Court explicitly stated that member states’
primary obligation was a negative one “not to expose persons to a risk of illtreatment proscribed by Article 3.”220 It also imposed the narrower obligation
of investigating medical treatment available in the receiving country.221 EU
member states were to “consider the extent to which the individual in question
will actually have access” to medical care and facilities in the receiving
state.222 The Court cabined this obligation by stating that “[t]he benchmark is
not the level of care existing in the returning state” and that Article 3 does not
provide “a right to receive specific treatment in the receiving State which is
not available to the rest of the population.”223 The Court did say that where
the returning state’s investigation does not resolve doubts about whether the
individual would receive treatment, it “must obtain individual and sufficient
assurances from the receiving State, as a precondition for removal, that
appropriate treatment will be available and accessible.”224
Under this reformulated standard, the already deceased Paposhvili was
the first person to prevail in his Article 3 health-based non-refoulement claim
since D.225 However, the Court based its decision on narrow grounds. The
Belgian government, it stated, had not conducted “any assessment . . . of the
risk facing the applicant” if he were returned to Georgia.226 Thus, the victory
was essentially procedural: because Belgium had not fulfilled its obligation to
218
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investigate, refoulement would violate Article 3. The Court implicitly left
open the possibility that refoulement may have been proper after an
investigation. Given Paposhvili’s numerous health conditions and their
advanced state, the decision does not appear to represent much of a retreat
from the high standard in N.
In sum, to prevail on a health-based non-refoulement claim, the
applicant must show “very exceptional circumstances.” To satisfy this
standard, the applicant must either be near death or face “a serious, rapid and
irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering
or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.”227 Where the applicant meets
his or her initial burden of proof, the returning state must attempt to rebut it,
and must investigate whether the applicant would actually have access to
medical care in the receiving country and obtain individual assurances from
the receiving country if necessary. As described below, the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area remains quite stringent and is unlikely to protect
many individuals who have been denied asylum and seek non-refoulement
due to complications from COVID-19.
C.

Critique of the Current Non-Refoulement Standard for HealthBased Claims

In the five years since Paposhvili was decided, scholars have disagreed
on the degree to which it departs from D and N. Calling the case a “reversal”
of D and N,228 Bilal Khan wrote that the case “significantly develops and
improves the law on medical expulsion.”229 In contrast, Vladislava Stoyanova
viewed the “other very exceptional cases” standard the Court developed as “a
very slight opportunity” and stated that “N v UK has not been reversed.”230
Ultimately, Stoyanova’s view is correct, particularly in light of the pandemic.
Fundamentally, the Court has retained the “very exceptional
circumstances” standard, which it refers to as “a high threshold for the
application of Article 3.”231 The Court itself has indicated that it does not
believe many individuals should qualify for relief from refoulement based on
illness.232 It is true that the Court no longer requires the applicant to be on
death’s doorstep, but the fact that different situations are called “other very
227
228
229
230
231
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exceptional cases” places them in a catchall category. This structurally implies
that they do not fit within the core of protection. Until a post-Paposhvili case
applies this standard, it is hard to say what factual scenario is required to meet
it. Regardless, this framework will make it easier for the ECtHR and other
courts to deny applicants, particularly given how often the Court fails to give
the underlying reason for its decisions.233
Since its decision in D, the ECtHR has often left its methodology
implicit to leave itself room to maneuver. As discussed above, the Court was
implicitly balancing individual and community interests before it made this
explicit in N. In Paposhvili, the Court did not explicitly disavow the balancing
test, instead stating that “the approach offered hitherto should be clarified.”234
The Court implicitly rejected the balancing test by noting that the Human
Rights Centre deemed it “in glaring contradiction” to non-refoulement cases
that do not concern illness.235 The Court adopted many of the Human Rights
Centre’s suggestions, indicating that it generally agreed with the arguments.
By stating that the obligation not to refoule is negative, the Court theoretically
left no room for a balancing test.236 However, because the Court did not
expressly reject the balancing test, it may more easily employ it in the future.
The pandemic, which has strained healthcare systems and required EU
member states to spend billions of euros on COVID-19-related health
measures,237 may tempt the Court to return to the balancing test.
The new procedural requirements Paposhvili imposes on member states
provide welcome protection for applicants but are also sufficiently malleable
to allow a finding that refoulement would not violate Article 3. Khan asserts
that the procedural requirements—requiring the state to rebut a prima facie
showing of risk and to investigate actual access to medical care in the
receiving country, and to obtain assurances from the receiving country where
necessary—must be read with the revised “very exceptional” test.238 While
this is true, the procedural requirements will leave many applicants
unprotected. First, the burden remains with the ill applicant to provide
sufficient evidence of a violation of Article 3. This is appropriate given that
the applicant is claiming relief, but it represents a significant challenge to an
233
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individual who is ill, likely has no lawful status, and may lack funds or
command of the lingua franca of the country. The high standard makes this
burden more difficult to sustain.
Second, the state’s obligation to investigate medical treatment in the
receiving country (the “medical investigation requirement”) was established
with so many caveats that it will be easy for states and courts to find that it
has been satisfied.239 The test is a welcome departure from the previous
standard of relying on the general availability of medicine and treatment
within the country without regard to the specific applicant. However, the
Paposhvili Court limited the requirement’s efficacy by stating that “[t]he
benchmark is not the level of care existing in the returning state.”240 The Court
further stated that Article 3 does not provide “a right to receive specific
treatment in the receiving State which is not available to the rest of the
population.”241 The first limitation leaves unresolved what the benchmark is:
is it a global average? A regional average? The median level of care available
in the receiving country? If the benchmark varies depending on the receiving
country, then individuals with the same medical condition and same inability
to pay for private care who are from different countries would essentially face
different standards. That result may be at odds with the absolute character of
Article 3 and the Court’s other jurisprudence on Article 3.
The second limitation may facilitate refoulement of individuals from
poorer, less developed countries, essentially adopting floodgates reasoning
and functioning similar to the N balancing test. An individual with a medical
condition for which no one in his or her country of origin may obtain treatment
may, by the Court’s reasoning, be returned to that country to face the fate of
others with the same illness. In contrast, an individual who cannot access
treatment that is available in the country, perhaps due to an inability to pay,
may be able to prevail under the Court’s reasoning. In the context of the
current pandemic, someone could be returned to a country where vaccines and
other treatments are largely unavailable to the general population, but not to a
country where they are generally available but the individual applicant faces
barriers to access. Current jurisprudence may protect poor individuals from
less poor nations, but not poor individuals from very poor nations. Thus, the
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Court is still accommodating its floodgates concerns in a manner similar to
the balancing test of N.242
These possible results are inconsistent with Article 3. The Court
cabined the obligation to investigate for the same reason it adopted the
balancing test in N: out of a desire to limit member states’ medical costs.243
Yet the scarcity of resources is irrelevant in the context of negative obligations
such as the obligation not to refoule.244 Thus, the Court has tied the
consideration of resources to the narrower obligation to investigate medical
conditions when evaluating refoulement, which ‘feels’ more like a positive
obligation. The Court appears to view it as part of the overall negative
obligation it identifies, though it was vague on this point.245 By doing so, the
Court has taken a ‘one hand giveth and the other taketh away’ approach in
which it imposes a new obligation on EU member states, thus appearing to
provide greater protection to ill noncitizens, while at the same time limiting
the scope of the obligation. Ultimately, as Stoyanova notes, the Court shows
more concern for procedural guarantees than for substantive protection.246
And because the Court significantly limited those procedural guarantees,
many individuals will not benefit from them in the end.
D.

Prospects for Protection for Migrants Suffering Long-Term
Effects from COVID-19

The current standard on non-refoulement for individuals suffering
serious illness is unlikely to protect many asylum seekers who lose their
asylum cases and suffer long-term health complications from COVID-19. The
ECtHR has adopted a test that is difficult to pass due to both its high standard
and its malleability. This section discusses these limitations as well as some
openings created by Paposhvili where the Court might provide more
protection for ill individuals claiming relief from refoulement.
Many individuals suffering from long-term effects of COVID-19 are
unlikely to meet the “very exceptional circumstances” standard. On a practical
level, ill migrants subject to detention may struggle to produce sufficient
evidence to make a prima facie showing that they can meet this high standard.
The only successful applicants so far are D, who was near death, and
242
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Paposhvili, who died before the case was decided. Many long-term effects of
COVID-19 will not reach the level of severity of those cases. Individuals who
need regular oxygen and would not have access in their home country may
succeed under the slightly more generous “other very exceptional cases”
standard. M.T., the case of the Kyrgyz national who needed dialysis, relied
heavily on the fact that dialysis machines existed in the receiving state,
without analyzing whether M.T. would actually be able to access one.247 Since
Paposhvili, the Court may not rely on such assumptions, which may help
individuals who rely on oxygen machines or other major medical equipment
that is not generally available to use at home in many countries. However,
individuals with heart issues or lethargy, other common long-term effects
medical experts have identified, likely cannot show that their illness is severe
enough.
The COVID-19 pandemic, like the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s and
1990s, may present the Court with many cases of individuals whose ailments
have a common origin. Being one of many where the standard is called “very
exceptional” will not help these applicants. Those with very unusual health
effects may be more likely to prevail by virtue of uniqueness, which will make
them stand out and assuage floodgates concerns. The underlying policy
rationale of protecting member states from strain on their healthcare systems
will be stronger in the context of the pandemic.
The medical investigation requirement is likely to provide only limited
substantive protection. Countries around the world are still developing
vaccines and treatments for COVID-19 and determining how they should be
administered.248 Poorer nations lag far behind wealthier ones in vaccination.249
Because EU member states do not have the obligation to alleviate differences
in treatment availability between nations, it may be easier to return individuals
to countries where treatment is less available. Furthermore, any benchmark
for the availability of care is likely to be lower in the context of the COVID19 pandemic because nations around the world are struggling to contain it and
to provide treatment. The level of treatment by any metric will be lower than
247
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it would be for a disease for which medical science has established a reliable
course of treatment.
However, the same floodgate concerns that will leave many without
protection on substantive grounds may also increase the likelihood that some
applicants will receive protection on procedural grounds. Paposhvili prevailed
in his Article 3 claim because Belgium did not adequately investigate whether
he would receive the treatment he needed in Georgia.250 If the COVID-19
pandemic gives rise to a flood of health-based non-refoulement claims, EU
member states will have to investigate each of these claims on an individual
basis as the Court required in Paposhvili. If some states struggle to manage
the burden of investigation or cannot obtain adequate information from the
receiving state, some applicants may prevail on procedural grounds. However,
if the member state later conducts an adequate investigation, it could try once
more to refoule the applicant.
The requirement that the returning state seek individual assurances
from the receiving state under certain circumstances may also provide
protection for some applicants. Some states may be unable or unwilling to
provide the kind of individual assurances the ECtHR requires, particularly
during a pandemic.251 If the ECtHR determines that the EU member state
needed to obtain assurances and failed to do so, then the state may not refoule
the applicant. However, because assurances of this type between nations may
rely on broader diplomatic concerns between particular countries, it is difficult
to predict how this process will work generally.
The highly contagious nature of COVID-19 does provide another basis
for asylum seekers to argue for non-refoulement. Asylum seekers who
contract COVID-19 while subject to mandatory detention may argue that they
became ill due to government action. They may frame the act of detaining
them as a government action and highlight the inadequate measures against
the pandemic in many facilities. Because the ECtHR has indicated that cases
involving government action will more easily merit protection,252 this framing
would situate the case more firmly within the traditional scope of Article 3.
However, the individuals would still need to meet the “very exceptional
circumstances” standard because they would still be arguing that refoulement
would violate Article 3 due to their ill health.
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In sum, current health-based non-refoulement jurisprudence is unlikely
to protect many failed asylum seekers seeking to remain in the EU due to
complications from COVID-19. Many applicants will fail to meet the “very
exceptional circumstances” standard. In the next section, this article suggests
areas in which the EU might develop its jurisprudence to clarify the standard
and protect more ill individuals.
E.

Proposed Changes to the Jurisprudence to Increase Protections
for Ill Applicants

The most obvious way to protect more ill applicants would be for the
ECtHR to abandon the high standard of “very exceptional circumstances.”
Given that the Court has repeatedly affirmed this standard over a period of
approximately twenty years, such a change is unlikely, particularly during a
pandemic. The article therefore suggests other changes to the jurisprudence
that answer questions Paposhvili left unresolved.
1.

Set a “floor” for the standard of medical care available in
the receiving country that forbids refoulement even if the
ultimate effect is to alleviate the disparity between the
level of care in the EU member state and the receiving
country

The ECtHR’s repeated statement that EU member states are not
responsible for alleviating the disparity in medical treatment available
between the returning country and the receiving country will, at a certain
point, contradict the absolute character of Article 3. It is also difficult to
reconcile with the duty to investigate to see if an individual would receive
medical treatment in the receiving country. Accordingly, the Court should
provide a “floor” below which the medical care available in the receiving
country will be deemed insufficient.
The Court has already implicitly adopted a minimum standard of
medical care, even before Paposhvili. For instance, in M.T., the case of the
Kyrgyz national who required dialysis, the Court observed that the country
did have blood dialysis machines.253 The Court thus implied that if there were
no dialysis machines, return would violate Article 3. The Court’s
jurisprudence has long set an (unofficial) minimum standard of medical care
available in the country. The Court should make this more explicit and provide
253
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illustrations of circumstances that would and would not establish that a
minimum standard of care was available. The minimum standard would vary
depending on the applicant’s health conditions and medical needs, and thus
would avoid creating a situation in which a particular country never reached
the minimum standard of medical care. This would assuage the floodgates
concerns that underlie the Court’s decisions in this area of law, and tailor the
standard to the applicant’s actual medical condition.
2.

Set a benchmark for the standard of medical care that is
not tied only to the level of care available in the receiving
country

The Paposhvili Court did not set a benchmark for the standard of care
that EU member states should use when investigating the feasibility of
refoulement. It only stated that the standard of medical care available in the
returning country would not be the benchmark.254 In a future case, the Court
should establish a benchmark that is not tied only to the standard of care in
the receiving country. Such a benchmark would contradict the absolute nature
of Article 3 and is also inconsistent with the Court’s other Article 3
jurisprudence. In Soering, a key non-refoulement case, a German national
argued that his extradition to the United States would violate Article 3 because
he would be exposed to the death penalty and extended detention on death
row.255 The Court agreed, applying European, not American, standards on
capital punishment and extended detention prior to execution.256
While a lack of medical treatment is not the same as detention and
execution, the Court must affirm the fundamental principles underlying
Article 3, particularly its absolute, non-derogable nature. The Court should set
a benchmark for the standard of care that is not tied to a particular country or
region’s level of healthcare but instead looks at the actual probability that the
individual will die or face “a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or
her state of health resulting in intense suffering or [] a significant reduction in
life expectancy.”257 If an individual meets the “very exceptional
circumstances” standard because treatment for her illness is not available to
anyone in her home country, an EU member state should not be allowed to
refoule her on the basis that it does not have the obligation to alleviate
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disparities between healthcare systems. Such an argument contradicts the
absolute character of Article 3.
It is true that this benchmark would likely shift the burden to care for
some individuals from the receiving state to the returning (EU) state. Some
individuals who may be refouled under current standards could not be
refouled under the type of benchmark recommended here. However,
establishing a clearer benchmark would also help both returning and receiving
states to understand their responsibilities in a given case, and would make it
easier to see if the receiving state could make the proper assurances that it
could care for the individual. Ultimately, concerns about increased burdens
on EU member states cannot justify refusing to set a benchmark, as Article 3
is absolute and does not permit balancing of hardships.
3.

Recognize a duty not to refoule where the applicant was a
bona fide asylum seeker who contracted COVID-19 while
in a migrant detention facility or reception center

EU member states should not be allowed to refoule seriously ill asylum
seekers who contracted COVID-19 while detained by the member state.
Because many EU member states impose mandatory detention or otherwise
restrict asylum seekers’ housing choices, they should bear responsibility for
the consequences of those policies. As outlined above, individuals who seek
asylum out of genuine fear for their safety are exercising a right under
international law that EU member states have agreed to recognize as parties
to the Refugee Convention. Many asylum applicants fail in their claims, not
because they committed fraud or have no genuine fear of return, but because
their fear of persecution is not tied to one of the five protected grounds. By
choosing to detain these individuals in government facilities, EU member
states assume a duty toward them.
Both the EU asylum framework and the ECtHR have recognized this
duty. The Reception Conditions Directive provides that detained asylum
seekers are entitled to a minimum level of healthcare.258 According to the
ECtHR, “Article 3 also imposes requirements on State authorities to protect
the health of persons deprived of liberty.”259 The Court has shown concern for
conditions asylum seekers face in detention and reception facilities.260 This
concern should continue even if the individual does not prevail on his or her
asylum claim. Where the conditions of mandatory detention cause an
258
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individual to contract COVID-19, and serious health consequences result, the
member state’s duty should be extended beyond the period during which the
government evaluates the individual’s asylum claim. Because the Returns
Directive allows member states to detain individuals for up to eighteen months
after their asylum claims are denied,261 the member state’s duty to the
individual will also extend beyond the period during which the asylum claim
is pending in many cases. The member state’s decision to detain an individual,
not its adjudication of the asylum claim, forms the basis of the duty.
This proposed duty not to refoule is consistent with Article 3
jurisprudence because it arises from actions taken by member states.
Detaining individuals and holding them in facilities constitute government
actions. As discussed above, many EU member states have chosen to continue
to detain asylum seekers during the pandemic, thereby exposing them to
conditions that facilitate COVID-19 transmission.
Because the duty not to refoule proposed here would be tied to specific
government actions, it is narrower in scope than the duty to rescue, which the
ECtHR has not adopted. In the wake of the N decision, Virginia Mantouvalou,
a professor of human rights and labor law, proposed that the ECHR be read to
impose a duty to rescue the nearby needy.262 Others have agreed that states
may owe greater obligations to individuals who are nearby than to those who
are distant.263 The Court has given no indication that it is willing to read such
a duty into Article 3. Such a duty provides a limiting principle based on
proximity, which the Court may fear would lead people to travel to EU
member states to receive medical treatment.264 Furthermore, a duty to rescue
does not distinguish between government-inflicted harm and harm from other
sources, which a majority of judges on the ECtHR have continued to do. The
duty proposed here, in contrast, requires a link between government action
and the harm suffered.
The state’s obligation to protect detained asylum seekers’ health may
be more properly considered a separate, positive obligation under Article 3.265
As noted above, such an obligation “is not absolute, and requires that the
relevant body take proportionate or ‘reasonable’ steps to protect.”266 Just as
the Paposhvili Court imposed on member states the obligation to investigate
261
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reception conditions and seek assurances without explicitly stating that it was
creating a separate positive obligation,267 the Court may choose to simply
observe that a member state owes a duty to individuals it has detained. This
vagueness would allow the Court room to maneuver, and would allow
individuals seeking non-refoulement to argue that the obligation is absolute
as part of the negative obligation not to refoule. If the Court recognized a
separate positive obligation, it would clarify member states’ responsibilities,
but would also allow them to argue that the steps they took to protect asylum
seekers’ health were reasonable. A less than absolute obligation could still
protect many detained asylum seekers because it would provide incentives to
detain fewer applicants, or at least to improve their living conditions in
detention. Under either approach, the key to improving individuals’ chances
for relief is to link the state’s decision to detain an asylum seeker to the harm
the individual will face upon refoulement, even if that harm comes most
immediately from a naturally occurring illness.
This duty not to refoule would be limited in duration. If an individual
completely recovers from COVID-19, the argument for non-refoulement
based on health disappears, and the member state may attempt to return the
individual as the law permits. The duty would essentially relax the “very
exceptional circumstances” standard for the period of the individual’s illness
on the basis that government action caused the individual to become sick with
a contagious disease; therefore, the harm is not due to a naturally occurring
illness alone. Ultimately, member states that improved sanitary conditions in
detention facilities or chose to detain fewer individuals would face fewer
claims based on this duty. They would thus have more control over
refoulement under this duty than they would under a duty to rescue. In sum,
the proposed duty ties non-refoulement to specific government actions, which
narrows its scope and gives member states more control. At the same time, it
has the potential to help save lives.
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CONCLUSION
The international community must reform current refugee law to
address gaps in protection, and the European Union should reform its common
asylum framework to ease the strain on both member states and asylum
seekers. However, such changes will take time and negotiation. The COVID19 pandemic requires a more immediate solution to protect individuals with
genuine fear of refoulement who are denied asylum, contract the virus while
detained, and suffer long-term health consequences.
Article 3 of the ECHR should protect these individuals. The European
Court of Human Rights should apply the article in a manner consistent with
its absolute character rather than the floodgates concerns that have historically
characterized the Court’s health-based non-refoulement jurisprudence. While
the Court is unlikely to abandon the “very exceptional circumstances”
standard, it can and should impose additional safeguards. The Court should
recognize that there is a standard of medical care below which no one should
fall and should not tie its benchmark for acceptable care to the standard of
care in the receiving country alone. Finally, the Court should impose on EU
member states a duty not to refoule ill asylum seekers whose applications have
been denied and who contracted COVID-19 while in the member state’s
custody. These measures would allow the Court to retain its high standard
while ensuring that individuals are not refouled to life-threatening situations.

